Introduction
Imagine the challenges that a 3-year-old child's memory faces compared to that of an adult: The world is less predictable and the vocabulary is less familiar. Typically developing 3-year-olds are just beginning to harness the vast power of human language, and 3-year-old's memory skills are only beginning to develop into their adult forms. For instance, children's working-memory capabilities have been demonstrated to increase as they mature (Siegel & Ryan, 1989) . When compared with adult memory performance, young children demonstrate greater susceptibility to false memory formation in some circumstances (Ceci et al., 2007) and less susceptibility in others (Brainerd et al., 2008) . Metacognitively, children are often less effective at generating and implementing helpful retrieval and encoding strategies than adults (Chi, 1978) . In many ways, young children's memories are quite different from adult memories.
It is unsurprising then, that the available research examining competencies in memorial attribution and memory decision making demonstrate that these skills do not appear until later in childhood (for a review see Bjorklund et al., 2009) . Currently, the available data examining this question is rather sparse. Understanding how children develop the skills required in order to use these complex response strategies is an important topic of study for memory researchers for several reasons. First, research examining the development of children's memory skills helps to address classic developmental questions such as the extent to which these memory response strategies may develop through the child's examination of their own memory's successes and failures or the extent to which retrieval is constrained by biology. Second, understanding how children develop advanced memory skills could help in the development of techniques and interventions designed to assist developmentally delayed children in generating more effective memory strategies. Finally, understanding the developmental trajectory of children's memory response strategies may yield important insights into the question of how, when, and where both children and adult participants use metamemory to guide their response strategies -an issue that has recently generated some theoretical debate (cf. Karpicke et al., 2008; Whittlesea et al., 2005) . The goal of the present chapter is to review what is known about the development of one such process: the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition memory.
What does it take to use the fluency heuristic?
Fluency may be described as the speed or ease with which an item, person, event, or experience is processed. Two types of fluency have been discussed most frequently: perceptual and conceptual. Perceptual fluency refers to enhanced processing due to the physical characteristics of the item (e.g., easy-to-read font) whereas conceptual fluency is a product of semantic overlap (e.g., faster access to 'cat' after seeing 'dog'). There is quite a bit of evidence suggesting that people are more likely to claim to remember fluently processed test items, suggesting that participants are at least implicitly aware of the correlation between speedy mental processing and familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Whittlesea, 1993 ; for an alternative interpretation see Winkielman et al., 2003) . Environmental stimuli that have been previously encoded and processed are easier to subsequently process than novel stimuli. When rememberers become aware that previously experienced stimuli tend to be quickly processed they use this knowledge to guide future memory decisions. Specifically, they develop a heuristic in which they are more likely to identify a fluently processed stimulus as a target relative to stimuli that are less fluently processed. In addition to helping recognize familiar items, over-reliance on this heuristic has been shown to result in memory illusions. During laboratory memory tests, participants who are exposed to stimuli that have been made artificially fluent are more likely to call these stimuli 'old,' regardless of whether they have been previously experienced. This artificial fluency can be perceptual (e.g., enhanced through the presentation of a masked word that matches the test item) or conceptual (e.g., preceding the test word with a predictive sentence stem).
The manner in which participants decide whether or not to attribute fluency as evidence of previous occurrence is not entirely straightforward. That is, high levels of fluency do not always lead to high levels of 'old' recognition decisions. Whittlesea and Williams (1998) addressed this point nicely by asking the question: 'Why do strangers feel familiar, but friends don't?' Despite the fact that the faces of our friends are no doubt processed quite fluently, we are not generally overcome by feelings of familiarity when we see them. However, unexpectedly encountering a long forgotten high school classmate in the supermarket may cause a tidal wave of familiar feelings as
